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1 Introduction - Market freedom 
and ethical absolutism 
 
Adam Smith (1774/2001) famously pro-
posed that the intervention of an invisi-
ble hand would transmute the general 
greed and self interest of players in free 
markets into the beneficial effects of a 
general improvement in welfare. Sellers 
and buyers compete to minimize re-
source waste and markets then optimize 
prices accordingly. Free markets opti-
mally allocate scarce resources. Mo-
nopolies appropriate resources undesira-
bly and should be made to behave like 
firms under free competition. Other than 
that, classical economists wish govern-
ment regulation of markets to be as little 
as possible. 
 
Political philosophers of a libertarian 
disposition similarly wish to reduce the 
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role of government to the minimum nec-
essary to ensure adequate safety for citi-
zens. This is one extreme of social con-
tract theory:  At the other extreme is the 
implicit social contract between the state 
and the privileged learned professional 
associations such as lawyers, doctors 
and CPAs. They are allowed to be self 
regulating by the state so long as such 
regulation operates in the interests of the 
community. This usually results in a 
plethora of very detailed regulations by 
the societies.. Near this end of the spec-
trum is the subdivision of the social con-
tract paradigm proposed by Donaldson 
(1982, 1988, and 1990) both alone and 
with Dunfee (1994, 1995, and 2002) 
Integrative Social Contract Theory 
(hereafter ISCT). It proposes that indi-
vidual firms and entrepreneurs are 
bound by agreements they make with 
each other, and that these agreements 
exist in a moral free space, where no 
interference or regulation is ethically 
justified, unless necessary to enforce 
what they call hypernorms. Hypernorms 
are generally agreed ethical constraints 
on contractual freedom. ISCT appeals to 
classical economists and libertarians, 
because it minimizes the role of state 
control and general regulation, so keeps 
markets as free as possible within any 
one country’s prevailing social and legal 
framework. 
 
 
2    Absolutism and imagined states of 
nature 
 
Social contract theories, such as ISCT, 
generate their hypernorms from an 
imagined condition rather than a real 
one. The imagined condition is a state of 
nature existing before any type of con-
tract. In that state a set of rational adult 
people is imagined who discuss among 
themselves what minimum regulation 
their community must have to serve eve-
ryone’s interests. For Hobbes, that 
meant an agreement to have a govern-
ment with a monopoly on the use of 
force, so that safety could be assured. 
For Rawls (1974), it meant equality of 
opportunity and a minimum social wel-
fare safety net in order to set a lower 
limit to permitted levels of destitution. 
For ISCT, it meant different things at 
different times as the theory developed 
from its long list in 1989 to a much 
shorter list by 1994. In a later formula-
tion by members of the Erasmus School 
in Rotterdam (van Oosterhout et al 
2006), the list of hypernorms has be-
come almost empty, so keen are the pro-
ponents on avoiding external interfer-
ence with free contracting whether for-
mal or informal.   
 
In mainstream jurisprudence, Kelsen 
(1934/2002) invented the idea of a Basic 
Norm for any society whose effect was 
to serve as the ultimate validating source 
of all of its law. The Basic Norm may be 
a written constitution, a sovereign’s de-
cree, the Koran or any other root agency 
or event any particular society regards 
the fundamental root of its identity.  
 
All Basic Norms begin with real histori-
cal events or real people in power or 
both. Social contract hypernorms, how-
ever, begin with imaginary states of na-
ture giving rise to imagined agreements 
about the content of social contract 
terms. Critics, especially feminist critics 
such as Held (1993), say this makes the 
authority of such alleged hypernorms 
doubtful 
 
Hypernorms are thus rooted in less solid 
foundations than jurisprudential basic 
norms, though to them are attributed a 
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similar legitimising and validating role 
within society by ISCT. 
 
 
3 Deontological dictatorship 
 
In contrast to social contract theory, the 
classical ethical frameworks, such Utili-
tarianism and Kant, or such development 
paradigms as Kohlberg’s (1978, 1981, 
and 1986); believe that ethical validity 
entails universal application. Utilitarian 
calculus is to be applied anywhere. 
Kant’s categorical imperative, in any of 
its three formulations, also is to be ap-
plied anywhere, anytime, to any one. For 
Kohlberg, if it was not universal, it was 
not ethics (Gilligan 1998). The univers-
alism of classical ethics sits uneasily 
with free market advocates, as it seems 
to legitimate restraints of trade and busi-
ness by reference to axioms, norms and 
beliefs indifferent to, sometimes hostile 
to, and often written centuries earlier 
than, regular business conduct.  
 
Moreover, once a politician, religious 
leader or regulator is convinced of his 
own insight into universal ethical valid-
ities, it becomes ethical for him to pre-
vent behaviour inconsistent with these 
norms and encourage behaviour that fur-
thers them. Dictatorship is said to be 
justified to achieve the ethical ends one 
is sure are right.  
 
If one’s ethical framework, like Kant’s, 
requires treating all other humans as 
ends in themselves not means, then dic-
tatorship can only be justified by the 
further belief that human nature is inca-
pable of treating people that way without 
effective legal and regulatory restraint. 
 
An ethical framework such as Kant’s 
grounded in an imaginary state of nature 
is no less capable of ending up enforced 
by a dictator than an ethics sourced in 
total isolation and introspective detach-
ment. Religious ethics, of course, are 
necessarily and proudly dictatorial. Ide-
ologies, notably Communism, are quite 
explicitly dictatorial, even if they say 
there will someday be a withering away 
of the state. 
 
In sum, Universalist ethical frameworks 
are susceptible to misuse by dictators 
precisely because they are Universalist. 
Hobbesian and Rawlsian social contract 
theories are Universalist; ISCT is not. 
Business generally, and free market pro-
ponents particularly, do not readily sup-
port dictatorships over themselves, 
whatever they may tolerate when it oc-
curs over others. 
 
 
4 Relativism as democracy: the 
case of ISCT 
 
ISCT shares with other versions of Con-
tractarianism the belief that ethical va-
lidity requires the prior consent of the 
parties. This crucial role for consent 
gives it a democratic credential quite 
absent from the traditional Universalist 
ethics. Such democratic credentials are 
obtained through the doorway of ethical 
relativism,. For liberals and libertarians, 
democratic credentials may be more im-
portant than the mental security obtain-
able from Universalist ethical absolutes. 
Free marketers, Friedmanites, the Chi-
cago School of economists and conser-
vatives naturally suspicious of any grand 
theory may all join postmodernists in 
finding attractive the moral free space 
inhabited by ISCT. The concession to 
hypernorms may be like Milton Fried-
man’s concession that although the so-
cial responsibility of the firm is to in-
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crease its profits, nonetheless it should 
obey the law. It seems like a concession 
made to broaden the potential market for 
the intellectual product rather than a sin-
cere commitment. That however is much 
less applicable to the Donaldson Dunphy 
(hereafter DD) version of ISCT than the 
Erasmus School’s (van Oosterhout et al, 
2006) recent adaptation of it. DD take 
hypernorms very seriously, are clearly 
committed to their crucial role within 
ISCT but have a difficult time deciding 
what the content of current hypernorms 
are or should be. 
 
The core propositions of ISCT are as 
follows per Corny (1995): 
 
1. Local economic communities may 
specify ethical norms for their mem-
bers through micro social contracts. 
2. Norm-specifying micro social con-
tracts must be grounded in informed 
consent buttressed by a right of exit. 
3.  In order to be obligatory, a micro 
social contract must be compatible 
with hypernorms. 
 
DD themselves (1994: 264-65) general-
ize ISCT thus: 
A norm (N) constitutes an authentic ethi-
cal norm for recurrent situation (S) for 
members of community (C) if and only 
if: 
 
1. Compliance with N in S is ap-
proved by most members of C. 
2. Deviance from N in S is disap-
proved by most members of C. 
3. A substantial percentage (well over 
50%) of the members of C, when 
encountering S, act in compliance 
with N.  
 
ISCT holds that the convergence of reli-
gious, cultural and philosophical beliefs 
may imply a hypernorm, as may widely 
endorsed standards such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
  
Thus, a local community's micro-norm, 
supported by consent and the right to 
exit, is—if it does not violate a hyper-
norm—a "legitimate" norm. If norms 
conflict, then their reconciliation or pri-
oritization is facilitated by the following 
guidelines:-  
 
1. Transactions solely within a single 
community, which do not have sig-
nificant adverse effects on other 
humans or communities, should be 
governed by the host community's 
norms.  
2. The more extensive or more global 
the community which is the source 
of the norm, the greater the priority 
which should be given to the norm. 
3. Where multiple conflicting norms 
are involved, patterns of consistency 
among the alternative norms pro-
vide a basis for prioritization. 
 
Clearly the ethical validity of micro-
norms within ISCT is strongly affected 
by what the hypernorms actually com-
prise. 
 
Donaldson (1989: 81) initially proposed 
the idea of fundamental international 
rights that limit the free decision-making 
capabilities of international actors, in-
cluding businesses. It is interesting to 
consider both content and the order of 
priority of this list. 
 
1. The right to freedom of movement. 
2. The right to ownership of property. 
3. The right to freedom from torture. 
4. The right to a fair trial. 
5. The right to non discriminatory 
treatment (freedom from discrimi-
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nation on the basis of such charac-
teristics as race or sex.) 
6. The right to physical security. 
7. The right to freedom of speech and 
association. 
8. The right to minimal education. 
9. The right to political participation. 
10. The right to subsistence.  
 
Horvath (1995) shows that, in his reply 
to Hodapp (1990), Donaldson (1990: 
137) goes further: "... we will allow pro-
ductive organizations to operate only on 
the condition that they respect rights, 
observe standards of justice, and respect 
broader societal needs. Hence, tbe pro-
ductive organization is not morally enti-
tled to harm unemployed persons, nor is 
it entitled to harm unemployed persons, 
nor is it entitled to deny tbeir rigbts, to 
treat them unjustly, or to damage their 
natural environment." 
 
DD's 1994 (p267) list of hypernorms 
has, however, shrunk to the following: 
 
• core human rights, including those 
to personal freedom, physical secu-
rity and well-being, political par-
ticipation, informed consent, the 
ownership of property, the right to 
subsistence; and 
• the obligation to respect the dignity 
of each human person. 
 
We may wonder why there is such a dif-
ference between the two lists, so close in 
time but so different differ in scope and 
specificity. 
 
ISCT was explained by Dunfee and 
Donaldson (1994, 1999, and 2002) as 
lying midway between ethical relativism 
and ethical absolutism in a way that 
combines individual contracts with 
deeper social contracts. It recognizes the 
authority of such ‘key transcultural 
truths’ as the idea that all humans de-
serve respect. It inhabits a ‘moral free 
space’ where economic communities 
and nations have their own norms unless 
those norms entail ‘flagrant neglect of 
core human values’. The minimum con-
tent of a global social contract is arrived 
in a state of nature and comprises the 
rights of individuals to voice within and 
exit from any group and compatibility 
with globally accepted hypernorms rec-
ognized by religions, philosophies and 
cultural beliefs around the world., espe-
cially for businesses these three, per van 
Oosterhout et al (2006): 
 
1. firms should adopt adequate health 
and safety rules for their workers 
and give them the right to know the 
risks of doing any relevant jobs, 
2. no lies should be told 
3. business obligations should be hon-
ored in a spirit of honesty and fair-
ness. 
 
The Van Oosterhout et al (2006:522)  
writers praise contractualism’s ‘content 
independent normative commitment, 
based on whatever norms institutions 
choose to live by which as a result they 
say ‘coheres well with liberal democracy 
and a system of free market exchange”, 
and they do not posit any specific hyper-
norms, only general and abstract ones. 
  
 
5   Problems with social contract 
theory in general 
 
There are at least three basic problems: 
1) the accuracy of the descriptions of 
human nature,  
2) questions about the normative au-
thority of human nature, and  
3) whether the logic connecting human 
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nature to a particular form of gov-
ernment is real, is sufficiently 
strong, is determinative.  
 
The conceptual problem is obvious; if 
human nature is so ephemeral that the 
major theorists define it in such different 
ways, then a normative architecture, 
where human nature is an ingredient for 
the foundation's cement, will be too 
weak to support an ethical framework or 
any social contract. 
 
Darwall (2006: 208) says ‘mutual ac-
countability is what morality is funda-
mentally about’, but others, such as 
Keeley (1995) question the concept of 
consent as a viable ethical criterion. 
Even assuming that consent is norma-
tively significant, why should we think 
that hypothetical consent has any norma-
tive force?  (Is it morally permissible for 
you to take my car without asking me, 
just because I would have consented had 
you asked?)   
 
Van Oosterhout et al (2006: 528) say no 
idea of contract ‘could carry normative 
force under conditions of slavery or dic-
tatorship, or when processes of exchange 
and social coordination are predomi-
nantly organized in a hierarchical and 
unilateral fashion’. However, one might 
counter that big business is organized in 
just such a fashion in most industries in 
most jurisdictions.  
 
Buss (2005) closely argues that deceit 
and manipulation can coexist with 
autonomy, but it is incompatible with 
the inner morality of ISCT. Brand-
Ballard (2004) argues equally closely 
that contractualism can only support re-
strictions on behavior outside the con-
tent of the contract or agreement by im-
porting deontic positions from outside 
its own framework. Moreover, the 
framework itself could allow cannibal-
ism, consent to being harmed, and it can 
exclude large blocks of people from its 
reach (Kittay 1999).  
 
Scanlon (2001) says validity of a moral 
right lies in whether it can be reasonably 
rejected so justification to self n others is 
bedrock of contractualism. This rules out 
unilateral protection of its citizens from 
their own folly. 
 
Darwall (2006) argues that the ground-
ing of morality in mutual accountability 
rules out state protection of citizens from 
the consequences of their own folly and 
that means negative externalities to a 
contract are born by everyone within and 
outside the contract. There is no rule 
against imposing externalities in ISCT, 
and hypernorms that do frown on such 
conduct are conceded by Scanlon (2001) 
to be deontic imports rather than part of 
contractualism’s own inner morality. 
The exclusion of children has been rec-
ognized by Scanlon (2001) who would 
appoint trustees able to contract on be-
half of the contractually disabled but this 
simply creates a new field for the prob-
lems of fiduciary duty to grow. 
 
 
6   Gender equality in search of a 
hypernorm 
 
To find an appropriate list of hyper-
norms, DD (1994:267) offer a survey of 
various writers, codes, and conventions, 
ultimately proposing a minimum stan-
dard of review for: 
 
(a) Core human rights, including 
those to personal freedom, physi-
cal security and well-being, politi-
cal participation, informed con-
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sent, the ownership of property, 
the right to subsistence, and 
(b) The obligation to respect the dig-
nity of each human person.  
They believe that constructing a list of 
hypernorms, or even delineating criteria 
for their discovery, is difficult. Mayer 
and Cava (1995) note that, as a result of 
this difficulty, following the prescribed 
ISCT procedure in gender discrimination 
cases becomes problematic. To put the 
legal/ethical interaction into some per-
spective, they suggest consideration of at 
least three types of examples. In Type I 
examples, a company valuing gender 
equality operates in a host country 
whose values and laws are intolerant or 
even hostile to gender equality. In Type 
II examples, a company valuing gender 
equality operates in a host country 
whose values — but not laws — are hos-
tile to gender equality. In Type III, a 
company not valuing gender equality 
operates in a host country whose values 
and laws promote gender equality. 
 
We cannot readily apply the hypernorm 
aspect of DD's in the type II of case; a 
conflict of cultural values between home 
and host country in which laws are not 
clearly dominant as factors in manage-
rial decision-making. We cannot do so 
because of a conceptual cloudiness over 
hypernorms — what they are and how 
we may come to know them. 
 
If there are both empirical and rational 
origins of hypernorms, the reality of a 
global hypernorm favoring gender 
equality in work settings is doubtful, 
since many countries appear to reject 
gender non-discrimination in work set-
tings. To use the epigram of a South Af-
rican apartheid era writer from her major 
global survey, women throughout the 
world are largely "poor, pregnant, and 
powerless." (Rhoodie, 1989).  
Even if ISCT were still to include as 
global hypernorms principles that favor 
equal authority and opportunity for 
women in the workplace, there is, say 
Mayer and Cava (1996), no clear im-
provement over deontological ap-
proaches to multinational gender equal-
ity issues. Where values are in flux and 
in conflict, the very situations that call 
for a theory of business ethics that can 
provide nuance and principle without 
ethical relativism or ethical imperialism, 
hypernorms are likely to be needed to 
complete the calculations in DD’s algo-
rithm. For issues of gender equality, 
ISCT as yet provides neither "detailed 
normative assessment of particular ethi-
cal problems in economic life" nor 
"unequivocal boundaries on moral free 
space" (quotes are from DD, 1994: 279). 
Accordingly, ISCT is not yet more de-
tailed, flexible, or practical than standard 
normative theories such as Kantianism 
or universal rights. It may also be seen 
as not yet really ethical, as it is not yet 
clear by which specific hypernorms, 
business contracting should be bound. 
 
 
7 Care theory fills the hypernorm 
vacuum 
 
Hoffman (1989) argued that justice first 
of all presupposes an attitude of caring, a 
sense of compassion for those in a less 
advantageous position and only secon-
darily is concerned with matters, rights, 
equality or merit. Noddings (1994) for-
mulated the first care theory framework. 
She said that traditional theories that 
place justice as the foundation of moral-
ity are wrong. Instead, care should be 
the foundation, with justice as the super-
structure. Ethics then is concerned with 
relationships, not with atomistic indi-
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viduals. 
 
Care theory takes as its distinctive ele-
ments an attention to particular others in 
actual contexts (Held, 1987), a focus on 
the needs versus the interests of those 
particular others (Tronto, 1993), and a 
commitment to dialogue as the primary 
means of moral deliberation (Benhabib, 
1992). Care may even be "not a system 
of principles, but a mode of responsive-
ness" (Cole and Coultrap-McQuin, 
1992). 
 
According to Noddings (1994), people 
naturally privilege their family members 
and friends in making decisions. She 
wants us to move beyond that immediate 
circle to care for others who are related 
to us either through our intimates or 
through some role we play—for exam-
ple, at work. Noddings sees relation-
ships, and thus caring, as not stopping 
even with everyone we know. Instead, 
we are even to care for those with whom 
we have no present relationship, merely 
an anticipated hypothetical relationship. 
Noddings defends herself against the 
charge of ethical relativism by arguing 
that a caring attitude is universal, indeed 
that it is fundamental to all humans. 
However, she rejects universal laws, 
saying that ethics is about concrete, par-
ticular relationships, not abstract con-
cepts like the good of society. 
 
Moral dilemmas for Noddings are not 
individual but relational, not a mono-
logue but a dialogue, because each 
moral dilemma will involve a relation-
ship and thus affect all people involved 
in that relationship. Consensus is the 
goal of all those engaged in dialogue 
regarding moral dilemmas. Above all, 
we are not to cause anyone pain or sepa-
ration. No good is worth that. 
Such feminist ethicists as Noddings 
(1994) and Held (1993) saw the mother 
baby relationship as the foundation of all 
ethics, because it is the historical foun-
dation for everyone of all their subse-
quent relationships (the baby part that is, 
not the mother part). Other feminists 
consider friendship as the ideal relation-
ship (e.g., Baier, 1985; Code, 1987). 
This relationship is voluntary, not per-
manent, and can be equal, although it 
often is not. It seems to be a better 
model for real-world relationships, par-
ticularly among stakeholders: but other 
relationships also exist in the real world, 
notably relationships of convenience or 
necessity that may not be modeled well 
by friendship. 
 
A problem with some feminist writing 
on care theory (e g Gilligan 1982) is that 
it often seems to place caring and justice 
in opposition to each other. Tong (1993) 
argues that caring and justice are not 
opposed but complementary attributes of 
the good society: both are necessary but 
not sufficient.  
 
However, care as a source of ethics faces 
the difficulty of compatibility with com-
petitiveness. MacIntyre (1984: 254) 
quoted by Dobson (1996) argues that 
"..the tradition of the virtues is at vari-
ance with central features of the modem 
economic order .." Specifically, Macln-
tyre isolates three "central features of the 
modern economic order" that exclude it 
from the virtues. These are 
"individualism ... acquisitiveness and its 
elevation of the values of the market to a 
central social place". However, just as 
individuals may reach the limit of their 
care capacity at the front door, so com-
pany people may not need to care so 
much about competitors as about stake-
holders, but such limits are quite consis-
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tent with care theories approval of care 
intensity diminishing as relations are 
more remote. More specifically, care 
theory provides a possible decision rule 
for the firm that wants to apply the care 
concept to its interactions with stake-
holders:-"I will privilege those with 
whom I have a close relationship." This 
is not necessarily a relativistic rule. 
Relativism concerns a rule that is 
adopted by a particular individual or 
society as applicable only to that indi-
vidual or society. The quoted relational 
rule would be applicable universally. 
What is necessary from Noddings' point 
of view is that harm not be caused at 
all—but this seems impossible to fulfill 
in real life. What Burton and Dunn 
(1996) propose instead is a hybrid ap-
proach, recommending that special at-
tention be given to the least advantaged 
members of the moral community. Fol-
lowing Rawls (1971), the principle 
would then read, "Care enough for the 
least advantaged stakeholders that they 
not be harmed.” 
 
In the ethic of care, the focus is the con-
crete needs of particular individuals. It is 
the conduct of daily life, lived for the 
most part with long intervals in between 
the kind of moral dilemmas that have 
dominated business ethics discussions, 
that is its arena (Liedtka 1996). It places 
less emphasis on the exercise of free will 
and choice, and more on recognizing the 
moral demands ever-present imposed 
upon us (Scaltsas, 1992). Though this 
lack of interest in prescribing moral so-
lutions has raised questions as to the 
adequacy of care as a moral theory 
(Koehn, 1995), it suits well the realities 
of corporate life, which are often about 
that which is required, rather than that 
which is chosen. 
 
Noddings views general mission state-
ments claiming to care as representing 
only a "verbal commitment to the possi-
bility of care" (1994:18). The quality of 
particularity is essential—caring lives in 
the relationship between me, an individ-
ual, and you, another individual. With-
out this particularity, the caring connec-
tion is lost and we must re-label the new 
process: no longer "caring", it becomes 
"problem-solving", in Nodding's termi-
nology. “The significance of the differ-
entiation between caring and problem-
solving goes far beyond semantics. The 
process of defining generalized 
"problems" and decoupling these from 
the lived experiences of individuals who 
we see ourselves as having relationships 
with, risks two outcomes antithetical to 
care. The first is the loss of particularity 
and resulting dehumanization of the in-
dividuals in need.”(Liedtka 1996). Fer-
guson (1984) has argued  that bureauc-
racy is antithetical to the ability to care. 
The rules in a bureaucracy become, over 
time, the ends rather than the means. 
Thus, caring, even for the customer or 
client, is subordinated to perpetuation of 
the organization in its current state. Fi-
nally, Ferguson asserts that openness, 
which is central to caring, is impossible 
to sustain in a bureaucracy, as it threat-
ens the status quo that the structure lives 
to protect. 
 
It is only in the process of personally 
engaging with the particular other that 
we gain the specialized knowledge of 
their context, history, and needs that per-
mits us to fully care for them on their 
terms, rather than ours (Benhabib 1992). 
Herman (1993) has noted, in her explo-
ration of Kant's duties for benevolence 
and mutual aid, that the focus here, as 
there, is not on pursuing one's ends/or 
them, it is on enhancing their capability 
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to pursue their own ends. If, as Flanagan 
(1982) states, the "motor of cognitive 
development is contradiction, caring 
may well be comprised more of "tough 
love" than of indulgence. Bateson ob-
serves (1990:155): "The best care-taker 
offers a combination of challenge and 
support...To be nurturant is not always 
to concur and comfort, to stroke and flat-
ter and appease; often, it requires offer-
ing a caring version of the truth, 
grounded in reality. Self-care should 
include the cold shower as well as the 
scented tub. Real caring requires setting 
priorities and limits. Even the hard 
choices of triage have their own tender-
ness."  
 
Self-care, Gilligan (1992) argues, is a 
precondition for giving morally mature 
care to others. Similarly, bereft of a 
strong regard for particularity, commu-
nities can smother difference and subju-
gate those in need of care. The develop-
ment process evolves out of the aspira-
tions and capabilities of the cared for, 
rather than being driven by the needs 
and goals of the care-giver. Gilligan 
(1982) is supported in the above by 
Tronto (1993) and Slote (2000), though 
self care obviously becomes self indul-
gence when in excess. Caring is neither 
a positive nor negative attribute but in-
stead forms part of a subjectively experi-
enced relationship, which may be used 
both to control and/or to empower others 
(Chodorow 1978, Court 1994).  
 
Engster (2005) attempts to ground a gen-
eral paradigm on the basis of care theory 
by extending the work of such writers as 
Fineman (2004) and  Kittay (1999), who 
had grounded their own assertion of a 
general duty of care on the evident fact 
of our general inter-dependency. They in 
turn had developed their view from 
Clement (1996)’s earlier grounding of a 
general care duty in our not quite so 
readily evident fact of our condition of 
general vulnerability to others. Baier 
(1985) said what makes us human is the 
care we receive from others and that all 
unhealthy and sociopathic behavior 
could be traced back to a deficiency of 
care. Kittay (1999) asserts that society 
would cease to exist altogether if nobody 
cared for anyone else;- the implication 
being that care is a general duty because 
society must self-evidently be sustained. 
Fineman (2004, 48) agrees and focuses 
on ‘caring for’ rather than caring about 
in her assertion: “It is caretaking labor 
that produces and reproduces society.” 
 
 
8     Care as parentalism 
 
The replacement of the universalist fa-
ther of classical ethics by the caring 
mother of feminist care theory carries 
the danger of failing to respect the indi-
viduality of the other party. Brock 
(1996) reviews how Kultgen (1995) pro-
poses safeguards against this. 
 
For Kultgen, there is some appropriate 
form of caring which manifests itself in 
parents caring for children, and this 
should serve as a model for other con-
texts. 
 
Kultgen's definition of parentalism is 
this: 
Call the parentalistic agent, P, the 
subject acted on, S, and the paren-
talistic act, A. Then: Action A is 
parentalistic if and only if (a) P be-
lieves that A is an intervention in 
S's life; (b) P decides to perform A 
independently of whether S author-
izes A at the time of the perform-
ance; (c) P believes that A will con-
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tribute to S's welfare; and (d) P per-
forms A for this reason. An action 
is parentalistic if it is an interven-
tion in a subject's life for his benefit 
without regard to his consent. 
 
He offers us a principle for evaluating 
when parentalism is justified. His 
"Principle of Parentalism"  is this: 
Persons are justified in acting parentalis-
tically if and only if they believe that the 
expected value of the action for the re-
cipient is greater than any alternative 
and they have reason to trust their own 
judgment despite the opposition of any-
one, including the recipient. 
 
The potential for ‘nanny style’ dictator-
ship is evident in the above, and Brock 
(1996) proposes limitations to result in 
what she styles ‘the appropriate care 
view”  
 
For Protective Paternalism (i.e., inter-
vention which aims to protect S from 
harm independently of her consent): 
 
P may be justified in protective paternal-
istic intervention in the affairs of S in 
situation C, when both the following 
conditions are met: 
 
(TI). Great harm is likely to ensue to S 
from non-intervention in situation 
C. (The greater the harm, or the 
more irrevocable effects of that 
harm are likely to be, the more 
justified the intervention, ceteris 
paribus.) 
(T2). S does not know that grave harms 
are likely (or does not understand 
what that entails) for S in situation 
C. 
 
For Promotive Paternalism (i.e., inter-
vention which aims to bestow benefits 
on S independently of her consent): 
P may be justified in promotive paternal-
istic intervention in the affairs of S in 
situation C, when both the following 
conditions are met: 
(Ml). P has special responsibilities to 
care for or promote S's well-being 
in certain ways, W, in situations 
such as C. 
(M2). S is sufficiently vulnerable, de-
pendent, incompetent or ignorant 
so that S's well-being is unlikely to 
be promoted in ways, W, if P does 
not intervene, particularly in situa-
tions such as C. 
 
Thus any vacuums in the ISCT hyper-
norms could be filled by parentalistic 
intervention in specific contexts (and so 
not ground any new general restrictions), 
but such interventions would breach 
ISCT’s key requirement of consent. Care 
theory and ISCT are in head on conflict 
over the status of consent, and it is out-
side the scope of this paper to discuss 
the significance or curability of this con-
flict. 
 
 
9    Effects of a care theory framework 
on business conduct 
 
Corporate behaviour guided by the prin-
ciples of care theory would manifest like 
a refinement of the well known Theory 
Y, itself a humanization of the widely 
practiced and bottom line driven Theory 
X. 
 
 “If we think of ourselves as deeply and 
involuntarily connected, and we care 
about each other's survival more than 
our own, how do we approach corporate 
downsizing? If  we expect our work re-
lationships to move predictably from 
initial dependence through increasing 
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independence to separation, how does 
that influence our hiring, training, and 
promotion practices? If we value nurtur-
ing, encouraging, and empowering as 
managerial skills, how should we struc-
ture managers' compensation? If we 
value competitive striving and ranked 
achievements at a particular stage of 
employee development, what are the 
appropriate measures and rewards? How 
can we create an assessment instrument 
that fosters healthy competition, but also 
recognizes and celebrates the unique 
strengths of individual contribu-
tors?” (Derry, 1999)  
 
Liedka’s (1996) Table below shows the 
distinctions between the attitudes and 
behaviors she finds embedded in the 
transactional focus of the market mecha-
nisms versus the relationship-based 
processes of care (see the next page). 
 
 If caring organizations cannot be bu-
reaucracies, they have to nonetheless be 
coherent. Because the concept of reach 
is partially a function of decision-
making scope, the architecture of the 
organization would need to be highly 
decentralized. It would entail the crea-
tion of a  network of connections, where 
the focus was on the relationships be-
tween individuals, rather than the posi-
tion of "boxes" in a hierarchy.  Iannello 
(1992) has reported on similar efforts at 
"de-alienating the workforce," by putting 
"meaning and values back in jobs." 
Engagement, based on Kahn's work 
(1990), is itself the product of meaning-
ful work, a safe environment and the 
availability of resources. In this world, 
organizational members at every level 
need to be strategic thinkers, who under-
stand the organization's purpose and its 
capabilities, as they respond to ever-
changing opportunities to better meet 
customers' needs.  
 
Expertise will be shared and individuals 
will be teachers of some things and 
learners of others simultaneously, as 
individuals are constantly stretched to 
develop their talents. Contrary to the 
image of sentimentality often attached to 
the notion of care, "tough love," as noted 
previously, may be a more apt descrip-
tion. Caring organizations will need to 
be as tough-minded and results-oriented 
as any other organization. It will be their 
methods and aspirations that distinguish 
them, not their lack of attention to out-
comes. The values of mutual respect, 
honesty, and patience will be its founda-
tion. Similarly, there must be clear 
boundaries around each individual's and 
each organization's responsibility to 
care. Such focus is necessary to avoid 
overwhelming the care-giver with re-
sponsibilities that exceed his or her emo-
tional, intellectual, and physical capacity 
to care.  
 
 
10 Conclusion – Building the Union 
of Bottom Up or Grounded Busi-
ness Ethics 
 
Kant argued, "The basis of obligation 
must not be sought in human nature or in 
the circumstances of the world in which 
[man] is placed, but a priori simply in 
the concepts of pure reason." (Abbott 
1909:389). Despite its starting from such 
a different place from Kant, “ an ethic of 
care is clearly consistent with the 2nd 
formulation of the Categorical Impera-
tive to always treat persons as ends, and 
not merely means. Interpreting this 
within an ethic of care, however, would 
require that we recognize and treat each 
person as a concrete, rather than a gener-
alized other” (Benhabib, 1992). 
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Both ISCT and Care Theory are partici-
pative rather than detached. To the ex-
tent that this entails relativism in some 
sense, taking a non-universalist ap-
proach need not entail rejection of Kant-
ian moral norms. Nor does it require that 
we conclude they have no importance in 
the quest to expand international coop-
eration. Instead it means one should ap-
proach and develop these norms differ-
ently-that is, drawing on the local and 
particular to inform the search for shared 
understandings and traditions rather than 
start with the universal and assume one 
has what is necessary. Indeed, embrac-
ing a non-universalist position need not 
entail the rejection of international hu-
man rights or other cross-cultural moral 
norms (Wicks, 1998). However, there 
appear to be three key differences in tak-
ing a non-universalist vantage point. 
Role  Business as Market Business ad Caring 
 Transaction Relationship 
Customer Ancillary: Process is driven 
by organization’s need to 
sell its solution to some 
identified set of problems. 
These come with customers 
attached. 
Primary: Process is driven by the 
organization’s desire to attend care-
fully to customer’s self-defined 
needs and aspirations and facilitate 
their achievement. 
Employees Expendable/Replaceable: 
Their labor is purchased at 
market rates in order to pro-
duce and sell organization’s 
solutions. 
Primary: Developing members of a 
community of mutual purpose and 
linchpin that creates the organiza-
tional capability set and connects it 
with customer needs. 
Suppliers Interchangeable: Interested 
in selling their solutions as 
input into the production of 
next downstream product. 
As their customers, our firm 
is ancillary to their purpose. 
Primary: As partners in the process 
of attending to end uses in the value 
chain that we share, they attend to 
us and make possible our customers 
focus. 
Organization and Senior 
Management 
Primary: To plan, supervise, 
control, and monitor the 
processes of production and 
selling to ensure quality and 
efficiency. 
Supporting: To Create a caring 
context and systems which provide 
resources and decentralized author-
ity that enables employees to care 
for customers. 
Shareholders Primary: As owners of the 
business, their interests, in 
the form of profits earned, 
dominate decision-making. 
Supporting: As members of the 
workplace community, they pro-
vide capital that facilitates the proc-
ess of meeting the needs of other 
stakeholders. Their needs are met 
as project succeeds. 
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First, there is a greater skepticism and 
scrutiny brought against any candidate. 
Second, more attention is paid to the 
details of any alleged convergence in 
moral understanding to ensure that, for 
example, the language of rights and the 
content a given right may embody is 
truly shared. And third, ethicists would 
approach this task from within given 
traditions or cultural contexts to arrive at 
these notions rather than relying on a 
theoretical argument to generate them 
(i.e., more inductive or dialectical rather 
than purely/primarily deductive). 
 
Held (1993:195) says social contract 
theories of a Rawlesian or Hobbesian 
type which begin with independent man 
in a state of nature are wrong, since such 
a state of nature is quite impossible and 
therefore cannot validly serve as a start-
ing point for any theory, positive or nor-
mative, of human nature, inasmuch as 
any so called independent men would 
have begun life as babies dependent on 
mothers. Folbre (2001) applies similar 
criticisms to market and contractualist 
based morality paradigms, saying that 
productive labor and entrepreneurs first 
have to be bred and raised, and someone 
has to care enough to make that happen. 
Finally from this perspective, Kittay 
(2001:535) says the duty to care should 
be seen as a “categorical imperative…
derivable from universalizing our own 
understanding that were we in such a 
situation, helpless and unable to fend for 
ourselves, we would need to care to sur-
vive and thrive.” Engster (2005) won-
ders if there exists a basic human right to 
obtain care when it is needed, on the 
grounds that the such a right is a prereq-
uisite of human survival, survival being 
taken to be a self evident basic good. 
From here he ingeniously proceeds to 
make Care Theory’s particularity and 
relativism into a general theory in the 
following manner. Because resources of 
money, time and energy are limited, care 
effort has to be allocated according to 
some sort of priority schema. It is rea-
sonable and efficient for us to care more 
for those especially dependent on us 
such as our intimate family. This in-
cludes a primary duty to care for our-
selves enough to prevent us becoming an 
unnecessary burden on others. This 
‘universal principle of partiality’ is the 
core of Engster’s general care theory 
project. It means each person should 
care primarily for her/his intimates and 
dependants because generally that will 
distribute care resources most effectively 
across society. As for those left out and 
uncared for by their intimates, they be-
come the responsibility of everyone. 
However, he does not say how resources 
can consistently, fairly or effectively be 
allocated to such unfortunates whose 
numbers may be rather large and in-
creasing over time.  
 
Let us end this article with a quote from 
Solomon on the ethical executive to 
show what the essential contribution of 
care theory to corporate life would be, 
even though Solomons himself is a vir-
tue ethicist not a care theorist.  
 
“An executive who is forced to fire 
someone, a military commander who has 
to order men to their death may well feel 
and ought to feel distress because, while 
doing their duties, they also feel com-
passion. At such times, it is good to feel 
bad, and to avoid the pain is. in some 
sense, immoral. Thus when the execu-
tive pleads that 'it's just a business deci-
sion' or the commander insists that 'it's 
nothing personal' we can recognize in 
their detachment a kind of moral 'bad 
faith.' So much for the 'wisdom' that says 
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that "you shouldn't take it personally." 
 
Taking it personally is what converts a 
difficult or distasteful action into an ac-
ceptable one”. (Solomon 1998) 
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